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In order to improve the eavesdropping detection efficiency in a two-step quantum direct communication protocol, an improved 
eavesdropping detection strategy using the four-particle cluster state is proposed, in which the four-particle cluster state is used to 
detect eavesdroppers. During the security analysis, the method of the entropy theory is introduced, and two detection strategies are 
compared quantitatively using the constraint between the information that the eavesdropper can obtain and the interference that 
has been introduced. If the eavesdroppers intend to obtain all information, the eavesdropping detection rate of the original 
two-step quantum direct communication protocol using EPR pair block as detection particles will be 50%; while the proposed 
strategy’s detection rate will be 75%. In the end, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed. The analysis results show that 
the eavesdropping detection strategy presented is more secure. 
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The goal of researching cryptography is to ensure that the 
secret message is only available to the two authorized par-
ties of the communication and that the transmission will be 
altered. So far, it is trusted that the only proven secure 
cryptosystem is the one-time-pad scheme in which the se-
cret key is as long as the message. The two parties staying 
far apart who want to transmit their secret message must 
distribute the secret key first. However it is difficult to dis-
tribute the secret key securely through a classical channel. 
The quantum key distribution (QKD), whose task is to cre-
ate a secret key between two remote authorized users, is one 
of the most remarkable applications of quantum mechanics 
and the only proven protocol for secure key distribution. 
Since Bennett and Brassard presented the pioneer QKD 
protocol (BB84 protocol) [1] in 1984, a lot of quantum in-
formation security processing methods have been advanced, 
such as quantum teleportation [2–7], quantum dense coding 
[8–10], quantum secret sharing [11,12] and so on. 
In recent years, a novel concept, quantum secure direct 
communication (QSDC) [13,14] was put forward and stud-
ied by some groups. Different from the key distribution 
whose object is to establish a common random key between 
two parties, the secure direct communication is to transmit 
important message directly without establishing a random 
key to encrypt them first. Thus, the secure direct communi-
cation is more demanding on the security. As a secure direct 
communication, it must satisfy two requirements. First, the 
secure message should be read out directly by the legitimate 
user Bob when he receives the quantum states and no addi-
tional classical information is needed after the transmission 
of particles. Second, the secret message which has been 
encoded already in the quantum states should not leak even 
though an eavesdropper may get hold of the channel. That is 
to say, the eavesdropper cannot only be detected but also 
obtains blind results. As classical message can be copied 
fully, it is impossible to transmit secret message directly 
through classical channels. But when quantum mechanics 
enters into the communication, the story will change. 
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Another class of quantum communication protocols [15– 
17] used to transmit secret message is called deterministic 
secure quantum communication (DSQC). Certainly, the 
receiver can read out the secret message only after he ex-
changes at least one bit of classical information for each 
particle with the sender in a DSQC protocol, which is dif-
ferent from QSDC. DSQC is similar to QKD, but it can be 
used to obtain deterministic information, not a random bi-
nary string, which is different from the QKD protocols in 
which the user cannot predict whether an instance is useful 
or not. 
Many people are interested in researching QSDC, and 
many protocols like QSDC have already been proposed, 
including the protocols without using entanglement [18], the 
protocols using entanglement [19,20] and the two-way 
QSDC protocols [21–27]. The QSDC protocol can also be 
used in some special environments such as the environment 
proposed by Boström et al. [28] and Deng et al. [21]. In [28], 
Boström and Felbinger presented a famous QSDC protocol 
which is called “ping-pong” protocol. But researchers have 
found much vulnerability in the “ping-pong” protocol. For 
example, the “ping-pong” protocol cannot resist the “man- 
in-middle attack” and the transmission capacity is low. 
In order to improve the eavesdropping detection effi-
ciency in two-step quantum direct communication protocol, 
an improved eavesdropping detection strategy using the 
four-particle cluster state is proposed, in which the 
four-particle cluster state is used to detect eavesdroppers. 
During the security analysis, the method of the entropy the-
ory is introduced, and two detection strategies are compared 
quantitatively using the constraint between the information 
that the eavesdropper can obtain and the interference that 
has been introduced. If the eavesdroppers intend to obtain 
all information, the eavesdropping detection rate of the 
original two-step quantum direct communication protocol 
using EPR pair block as detection particles will be 50%; 
while the proposed strategy’s detection rate will be 75%. In 
the end, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed. 
The analysis results show that the eavesdropping detection 
strategy presented is more secure. 
For simplicity, we suppose that the protocol presented in 
[21] is shortened as DPP and the improved protocol in this 
paper is shortened as FPP. 
1  DPP Protocol 
An EPR pair can be in one of the four Bell states:  
 
 1 01 10 ,
2
   
 
(1) 
  1 01 10 ,
2
     (2) 
  1 00 11 ,
2
    (3) 
  1 00 11 .
2
     (4) 
If the state of a single photon being measured, the Bell 
state will collapse and the state of the other particle will be 
completely determined if we know the measurement result 
of the first photon. As is known to us all, the basic principle 
of the original “ping-pong” protocol is that one bit infor-
mation can be encoded in the states |   , which is com-
pletely unavailable to anyone who only has access to either 
of the particles. To extract secret message from Alice, Bob 
must own both particles, for no experiment performed on 
only one particle can distinguish these states from each oth-
er [28]. 
Let us start with a brief description of the DPP protocol. 
(S1) Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs in state 
|  , extracts all the first particles, and forms the sequence 
A in order. The remainder particles are formed the sequence 
B in order.  
(S2) Alice sends the sequence A to Bob. Alice and Bob 
then check eavesdropping by the following procedure: (a) 
Bob chooses randomly a number of the photons from the 
sequence A and tells Alice which particle he has chosen. (b) 
Bob chooses randomly one of the two sets of MBs, say σz 
and σx to measure the chosen photons. (c) Bob tells Alice 
the MB he has chosen for each photon and the outcomes of 
his measurements. (d) Alice uses the same MB as Bob to 
measure the corresponding photons in the sequence B and 
checks the results with Bob. If no eavesdropper exists, their 
results should be completely opposite. This is the first 
eavesdropping check. After that, if the error rate is small, 
Alice and Bob can conclude that there is no eavesdropper in 
the line. Alice and Bob continue to perform step (S3); oth-
erwise, they have to discard their transmission and abort the 
communication. 
(S3) Alice encodes her messages on the sequence B and 
transmits them to Bob. Before the transmission, Alice must 
encode the EPR pairs. In order to guard for eavesdropping 
in this transmission, Alice has to add a small trick in the 
sequence B. She selects randomly in the sequence B some 
particles and performs on them randomly one of the four 
operations. The number of such particles will not be big as 
long as it can provide an analysis of the error rate. Only 
Alice knows the positions of these sampling particles and 
keeps them secretly until the communication is completed. 
The remaining sequence B particles are used to carry the 
secret message directly. To encode the message, they use 
the dense coding scheme of Bennett and Wiesner [8], where 
the information is encoded on an EPR pair with a local op-
eration on a single particle. Here, the dense coding idea was 
generalized into secure direct communication. Different 
from dense coding, in this protocol, both the particles in an 
EPR pair are sent from Alice to Bob in two steps, and the 
transmission of EPR pairs is done in block. Explicitly, Alice 
makes one of the four unitary operations (U0, U1, U2 and  
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U3) to each of her particles:  
 0 0 0 1 1 ,U I     (5) 
 1 0 0 1 1 ,zU      (6) 
 2 1 0 0 1 ,xU      (7) 
 3 1 0 0 1 .yU i      (8) 
And they transform the stat |   into |  , |   , |   
and |  , respectively. These operations correspond to 00, 
01, 10 and 11, respectively. 
(S4) After the transmission of sequence B, Alice tells 
Bob the positions of the sampling pairs and the type of the 
unitary operations on them. Bob performs the Bell-basis 
measurement on the sequence A and B simultaneously. By 
checking the sampling pairs that Alice has chosen, he will 
get an estimate of the error rate in the sequence B transmis-
sion. In fact, in the second transmission, Eve can only dis-
turb the transmission and cannot steal the information be-
cause she can only get one particle from an EPR pair. 
(S5) If the error rate of the sampling pairs is reasonably 
low, Alice and Bob can then entrust the process, and con-
tinue to correct the error in the secret message using error 
correction methods. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abandon the 
transmission and repeat the procedure from the beginning. 
(S6) Alice and Bob do error correction on their results. 
This procedure is exactly the same as that in QKD. Howev-
er, to preserve the integrity of the message, the bits pre-
serving correction code, such as CASCADE [29], should be 
used. 
2  FPP Protocol 
2.1  The process of the FPP protocol  
In the protocol presented in [13], the transmission is man-
aged in batches of N EPR pairs. An advantage of block 
transmission scheme is that we can check the security of the 
transmission by measuring some of the decoy photons 
[30,31] in the first step, where both Alice and Bob contain a 
particle sequence at hand, which means that an eavesdrop-
per has no access to the first particle sequence, and then no 
information will be leaked to her whatever she has done to 
the second particle sequence. Follow this method using 
block transmission. The FPP scheme is proposed and shown 
in Figure 1.  
Define 
  1 0000 0011 1100 1111 .
2
      (9) 
Now let us give an explicit process for the FPP. 
(S1) Bob prepares a large enough number (N) of Bell 
states |   in order. He extracts all the first particles in  
 
Figure 1  The process of the FPP. 
these Bell states, forming the sequence A (the travel qubits) 
in order. The sequence A is used to transmit secure message. 
Then the remaining particles form the sequence B (the home 
qubits) in order. 
(S2) Bob prepares a large number (cN/(1c)) of 
four-particle cluster states |   and forms the sequence C 
to detect eavesdropping. Here, c expresses the probability of 
switching to the control mode in the original “ping-pong” 
protocol [28]. Note that the sequence C includes 4cN/(1c) 
qubits. Bob inserts the decoy photons C to the sequence A 
randomly, forming a new sequence D. Only Bob knows the 
positions of these decoy photons. 
(S3) Bob stores the sequence B and sends the sequence D 
to Alice.  
(S4) After Alice received the sequence D, Bob tells her 
the positions where the decoy photons are. Then, Alice ex-
tracts the decoy photons from the sequence D and performs 
four-particle cluster state measurement. This is the first 
eavesdropping check. If there is no eavesdropper, every 
result should be in the four-particle cluster state, and they 
continue to execute the next step (S5), the FPP protocol 
keeping on. Otherwise, the communication is interrupted, 
and the FPP protocol switches to (S1). 
(S5) Alice discards the decoy photons, then the sequence 
D becomes to the sequence A again. Alice encodes her 
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messages on the sequence A and transmits it to Bob. In or-
der to guard for eavesdropping in this transmission, Alice 
has to insert some four-particle cluster state particles in the 
sequence A before the transmission. Only Alice knows the 
positions of these decoy photons and keeps them secret until 
the communication is completed. The remaining sequence A 
are used to carry the secret message directly. To increase 
the transmission capacity, the dense coding scheme be used 
to encode the secret message. Different from dense coding, 
in this protocol, the transmission of EPR pairs is done in 
block. Explicitly, Alice makes one of the four unitary oper-
ations (U0, U1, U2 and U3) to each of her particles, and they 
transform the state |   into |  , |  , |    and 
|  , respectively. These operations correspond to 00, 01, 
10 and 11, respectively. Then Alice transmits the sequence 
A which carries decoy photons to Bob. 
(S6) After transmitting the sequence A, Alice tells Bob 
the positions of the decoy photons. Bob performs Bell-basis 
measurement on the sequences A and B simultaneously. By 
checking the decoy photons that Alice insert, Bob will get 
an estimate of the error rate in the sequence A transmission. 
In fact, Eve can only disturb the transmission and cannot 
steal the information because she can only get one particle 
from an EPR pair. If the error rate of the decoy photons is 
reasonably low, Alice and Bob can then entrust the process, 
and continue to transmit the secret message. Otherwise, 
Alice and Bob abandon the transmission and repeat the 
procedures from the beginning. 
As discussed above, the secret message can be transmit-
ted securely between Alice and Bob, and the eavesdropper 
will be found out if she disturbs the quantum line. Eve can-
not read out the information from the EPR pairs even if she 
captures the sequence A, because no one can read the in-
formation from one particle of the EPR pair alone. There-
fore, the improved protocol is secure. 
2.2  The security analysis of the protocol 
In the original “ping-pong” protocol, the author calculated 
the maximal amount of the information I(dlO) that Eve can 
eavesdrop and the probability dlO that Eve is detected [28]. 
And the function I(dlO) is provided. When p0=p1=0.5, 
 2 2( ) log (1 ) log (1 ).lO lO lO lO lOI d d d d d      (10) 
The above method can be used to compare the efficiency 
of eavesdropping detection between the two protocols. 
Now, let us analyze the efficiency of eavesdropping de-
tection in FPP protocol. In order to gain the information that 
Alice operates on the travel qubits, Eve performs the unitary 
attack operation Eˆ  on the composed system firstly. Then 
Alice takes a coding operation on the travel qubits. Eve 
performs a measurement on the composed system at last. 
Note that, all transmitted particles are sent as block before 
detecting eavesdropping, which is different from the origi-
nal “ping-pong” protocol. For Eve does not know which 
particles are used to detect eavesdropping, so what she can 
do is only performing the same attack operation on all the 
particles. As for Eve, the state of the travel qubits is indis-
tinguishable from the complete mixture, so all the travel 
qubits are considered in either of the states |0 or |1 with 
equal probability p=0.5. 
Generally speaking, supposing there is a group of decoy 
photons at the four-qubit cluster states |  , and after per-
forming the attack operation Eˆ , the states |0 and |1 be-
come 
 0 0 1| | 0 | 0 |1 ,E x x x  
          (11) 
 1 0 1| | 1 | 0 |1 ,E x m y n y
          (12) 
where ix  and iy  are the pure ancillary states deter-
mined by E

 uniquely, and 
 
2 2
1,    2 2 1.m n    (13) 
Then let us calculate the detection probability. Attacked 
by Eve, the state of composed system becomes 
 
       
       
       
 
Eve
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
2
1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
2
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x m y n y m y n y
m y n y m y n y x x x x
m y n y m y n
   
       
   
   
         
       
       
       
   
E
     1 0 1 0 1
4 3 3 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
3 2 2 2 2 3
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
3 2 2 2 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1
( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
2
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
y m y n y m y n y
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
      
      
     
    
   
   
   30 1 0 1 0 1 10 1 0 1 0 1 1x x x x x x x
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2 2 3 3 4
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
2 2
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
m x x y y mn x x y y mn x x y y n x x y y
m x x y y mn x x y y mn x x y y n x x y
    
   
   
   
   
    1
2 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
y
m x x y y mn x x y y mn x x y y n x x y y
m x x y y mn x x y y mn x x y y n x x y y
m y y x x m y y x x m y y x x m y
   
   
   
   
   
    0 0 1 1
2 2
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
2 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
y x x
mn y y x x mn y y x x mn y y x x mn y y x x
mn y y x x mn y y x x mn y y x x mn y y x x
n y y x x n y y x x n y y x x
   
   
  
   
   
   2 2 1 1 1 1
4 3 3 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
3 2 2 2 2 3
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
3 2 2 2 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
n y y x x
m y y y y m n y y y y m n y y y y m n y y y y
m n y y y y m n y y y y m n y y y y mn y y y y
m n y y y y m n y y y y m n y y y y

   
   
   3 1 0 1 1
2 2 3 3 4
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ).
mn y y y y
m n y y y y mn y y y y mn y y y y n y y y y





Obviously, when Alice performs four-qubit cluster state 




4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
1
( ) | | | | | | | |
4
              | | | | | | | |
              | | | | | | | |
              | | | | | | | | .
p
m n m n
m n m n
m m n m n n
      
   
   
   
   
   
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4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
1 ( )
1
    1 | | | | | | | |
4
       | | | | | | | |
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       | | | | | | | | .
lFd p
m n m n
m n m n
m m n m n n

     
   
   
 
    
   
   





2 2 2 2
,  ,  ,  a b m s n t     , where a,  





4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
4 2 2 4 4 2 2 4
1 ( )
1
    1 | | | | | | | |
4
       | | | | | | | |
       | | | | | | | |
       | | | | | | | |
1
    1 2 2
4
       2
lFd p
m n m n
m n m n
m m n m n n
a a b b s s t t

     
   
   
 
    
   
   
   
      
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2a t b t a s b s  
 
 
4 3 2 4 3 2
2 2 2 2
    ( 2 3 2 2 3
       2 2 2 2 2 ).
a a a a t t t
t a t at ta at
       
      (17) 
However, in DPP, authors have calculated the efficiency 
of eavesdropping detection. Here donot analyze it again, 
and the efficiency is  
 
2 2 2 2
1 1 .lDd            (18) 
Now, let us analyze how much information Eve can gain 
maximally when there is no control mode. First, Alice takes 
measurement on the photon in her hand with signal-photon 
detector and the state is 0  supposing that the quantum 
state of the photon in the hand of Alice is 0 , which is 
similar to that in [21]. Then the state of the system com-
posed of Bob’s photon is  
 00 01
00 01
0, 0 0 1
0, 1, ,
E E E E    
   





and Eve’s probe can be described by 
2 2
00 00 01 01
* *
00 01 01 00
0, 0, 1, 1,
 0, 1, 1, 0, .
      
      
  
   (20)
 
After encoding of the unitary operations U0, U1, U2 and 
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which can be rewritten in the orthogonal basis 00{| 0, ,   
01 00 01| 1, ,  | 1, ,  | 0, },      
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where  0,1,2,3i i   are the eigenvalues of ρ″, which are  
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     
2 2 2
0,1 0 3 0 3 0 3
2 2
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p p p p p p
p p p p p p d d
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In the case of p0=p1=p2=p3=0.25, where Alice encodes 
exactly 2 bits, expressions (25)–(26) simplify to 0 0.5d  , 
 1 0.5 1 d   , 2 0.5d   and  3 0.5 1 d   . Interest-
ingly, the maximal information gain is equal to the Shannon 
entropy of a binary channel:  
 0 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
log log
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
 log log .
2 2 2 2 2 2
I d d d d d
d d d d
                   
                  
  (27)
 
Then assume that Bob sends 1  rather than 0 . The 
above security analysis can be done in full analogy, result-
ing in the same crucial relations. The maximal amount of 
information is equal to the Shannon entropy of a binary 
channel: 
 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
log log
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
 log log .
2 2 2 2 2 2
I d d d d d
d d d d
                   
                  
  (28)
 
So the maximal amount of information that Eve can ob-
tain is 
    0 1 2 20.5( ) 1 log 1 log 1 .I I I d d d d        (29) 
After some simple mathematical calculations in FPP, 
when a=t, get 
 4 3 24 8 8 4 ,lFd a a a a       (30) 
and the maximum I is  
 
1 1
( ) 1 ( 1 2 1 ),
2 2lF l F
I d H d        (31) 
where  
 2 2( ) log (1 ) log (1 ).H x x x x x       (32) 
However, in DPP, the maximum I is  
 
     
 
2 21 log 1 log 1
1 .
lD lD lD lD lD
lD
I d d d d d
H d
    
   (33) 
The above analysis shows that function I(dlD) and I(dlF) 
have the similar algebraic properties. If Eve wants to gain 
the full information (I=2), the probabilities of eavesdrop-
ping detection are dlD(I=2)=0.5 in DPP and dlF(I=2)=0.75 in 
FPP. 
In order to contrast the two functions, Figure 2 is given. 
As are shown in Figure 2, if Eve wants to gain the full in-
formation, she must face a larger detection probability in  
 
 
Figure 2  The comparison of the two detection results. The dotted line 
expresses the function I(dlD) in DPP and the thick line expresses the func-
tion I(dlF) in FPP. Obviously, if Eve wants to get the full information, she 
must encounter the higher detection efficiency in FPP.  
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FPP than DPP. This also indicates that FPP is more secure 
than DPP.  
Taking the probability c of the decoy mode into account, 
the effective transmission rate, i.e. the number of message 
bits per protocol run, is 1c, which is equal to the probabil-
ity for a message transfer. Therefore, if Eve wants to eaves-
drop one message transfer without being detected, the 
probability for this event is 
 




s c d c c d c c d c
c
c d





Then the probability of successful eavesdropping I=nI(d) 








s I c d
c d




( ) 1 1 2 1 .
2 2
I d H d
           (36) 
Now let us analyze the security of the FPP. In the limit I
→∞ (a message or key of infinite length) get s→0, so the 
presented protocol in this paper is asymptotically secure. If 
the security of the quantum channel is ensured, the protocol 
is completely secure. For example, a choice of the decoy 
mode is c=0.5. In Figure 3, the eavesdropping success 
probability as a function of the information gain I is plotted, 
for c=0.5 and for different detection probabilities d which 
Eve can choose. Note that for d <0.5, Eve only gets one part 
of the message right and does not even know which part she 
has got. So, the FPP protocol is proved secure. 
3  Conclusion and further work 
In summary, an improved eavesdropping detection strategy 
based on four-particle cluster state in quantum direct com- 
 
 
Figure 3  Eavesdropping success probability as a function of the maximal 
eavesdropped information, plotted for different detection probabilities d. 
munication protocol has been introduced, and two eaves-
dropping detection strategies are compared quantitatively 
using the constraint between the information that eaves-
dropper obtains and the interference introduced. The key 
idea of FPP is same to the controlled order rearrangement 
encryption, which is to implement encryption and detect 
eavesdropping by disorganizing the cluster state particles. In 
FPP, the sequence B is always in hands of Bob and Eve can 
only touch the sequence A. Any useful message will not be 
leaked to the potential eavesdropper. So the security mes-
sage can be securely transmitted to the receiver. Compared 
with the DPP, in the FPP protocol, the four-particle cluster 
state particles are used to detect eavesdropping which in-
creases the efficiency of detection eavesdropping. 
In the analysis, if the eavesdropper obtains the full in-
formation, she must face a larger detection probability in the 
FPP than DPP, which shows that the efficiency of eaves-
dropping detection in FPP is higher than DPP. Therefore it 
can ensure that the quantum direct communication protocol 
is more secure. In order to detect eavesdropping, Bob sends 
more decoy photons than DPP, while this method reduces 
the number of measurement. That is, Bob gains the better 
security at the cost of sending more particles. 
Compared with the existing research working [32,33] 
based on the four-particle cluster state, the goal of utilizing 
the four-particle cluster state is different. The four-particle 
cluster state is not only used as the decoy photon, but also 
used to transmit secret message in [32,33]. And the four- 
particle cluster states are divided into two groups. Only one 
group was transmitted in the whole communication. How-
ever, the four-particle cluster state is only used as the decoy 
photon. The secret message is transmitted by Bell states. 
Moreover, the four-particle cluster state is randomly insert-
ed in the travel particles together. 
The preparation process of four-particle cluster state is 
complex relatively and the creating probability based on the 
present technology is lower. However, experimentally, 
Walther et al. [34,35] have used nonlinear optics to directly 
produce four-particle cluster state. Then, in 2008, Zhang et 
al. [36] and Tokunaga et al. [37] presented a simple scheme 
for generating such a cluster state and measuring it in the 
basis FMB, respectively. Moreover, as cluster state has been 
applied to one-way quantum computer [38]. Thus, the pre-
sented protocol is feasible in recent technology. 
As we know, the quantum direct communication protocol 
can also be used as an efficient QKD protocol. In this paper, 
only the situation that the improved protocol is used as a 
QKD strategy is considered. So the weaknesses which the 
quantum direct communication protocol must be faced, such 
as the noise channel [39,40], the Dos attack [41,42] and so 
on, may not be considered. In the further work, the other 
QSDC protocol will be researched. 
The work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of 
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